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Abstract:
The execution, clearing, and settlement of financial transactions are all subject to substantial 
scale and scope economies which make each of these complementary functions a natural 
monopoly. Integration of trade, execution, and settlement in an exchange improves efficiency 
by economizing on transactions costs. When scope economies in clearing are more extensive 
than those in execution, integration is more costly, and efficient organization involves a trade-
off of scope economies and transactions costs. A properly organized clearing cooperative can 
eliminate double marginalization problems and exploit scope economies, but can result in 
opportunism and underinvestment. Moreover, a clearing cooperative may exercise market 
power. Vertical integration and tying can foreclose entry, but foreclosure can be efficient 
because market power rents attract excessive entry. Integration of trading and post-trade 
services is the modal form of organization in financial markets, which is consistent with the 
hypothesis that transactional efficiencies explain organizational arrangements in these 
markets. 
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There is an old saw in the military that amateurs talk tactics, but profes-
sionals talk logistics. There is a clear parallel in ﬁnancial markets; although
the logistics of the ﬁnancial markets–clearing and settlement–attract little
popular attention, they are matters of primary importance to market pro-
fessionals. Of late, however, the organization of clearing and settlement
functions has assumed a greater public proﬁle. In particular, the integra-
tion of the clearing, settlement, and execution of transactions within a single
ﬁrm has drawn considerable criticism and anti-trust scrutiny, especially in
Europe.1 This was also a central issue in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange-
Chicago Board of Trade merger.
The primary objection to the “vertical silo” model of ﬁnancial trading
is that due to the substantial scale and scope economies in clearing, an
exchange integrated into all three functions can deny access to its clearing
and settlement facilities to foreclose entry by another ﬁrm oﬀering execution
services in the products traded on the integrated exchange. It has long been
understood, however, that vertical integration can also be an eﬃcient way
to organize transactions, because it can eliminate double marginalization,
mitigate holdups, and provide superior incentives to invest in speciﬁc assets.
Understanding the motives for vertical integration in ﬁnancial markets and
its welfare eﬀects therefore requires a detailed microanalytic analysis of the
economics of trading, clearing and settlement.
Thisarticleexamines these issues theoreticallyand empirically. It derives
1UK Competition Commission (2005). The Competition Commission found that
merger of the LSE and either Deutsch B¨ orse or Euronext would give the combined en-
tity “the incentive and ability to foreclose entry and expansion in the UK at the trading
level.” European industry groups have also expressed opposition to vertical integration on
competitive grounds. French Association of Investment Firms (2006).
2several conclusions:
• Trade execution, clearing, and settlement are all subject to perva-
sive economies of scale, and have strong natural monopoly tendencies.
Moreover, speciﬁc assets and coordination problems imply that po-
tential competition is unlikely to discipline the market powr of these
natural monopolies, and that competition for them will be dissipative.
• Integration of clearing, settlement, and trade execution mitigates in-
eﬃciencies resulting from multiple-marginalization and ex post oppor-
tunism, but is unlikely to lead to a ﬁrst-best outcome.
• Vertical integration is more eﬃcient than supplying trade execution,
clearing, and settlement by separate, for-proﬁt ﬁrms, and hence the
latter arrangement is unlikely to be observed in practice.
• Cooperative ownership by market users of clearing or settlement func-
tions can mitigate double marginalization if these cooperatives admit
all qualiﬁed participants and rebate surpluses to members in propor-
tion to their output. However, a cooperative may have an incentive
to restrict entry or charge supra-competitive prices, which results in
double marginalization. Moreover, arms length relationships between
trade execution venues and clearing and settlement cooperatives re-
sults in transactions costs that integrated exchanges do not incur.
• Clearing and settlement exhibit strong scope economies. There are
also sources of scope economies in trade execution, but it is by no
means clear that these execution scope economies are as strong as those
that characterize clearing and settlement. To the extent that there
are scope diseconomies in trade execution, integration can result in
3suboptimally small clearing and settlement operations, suboptimally
large execution operations, or both.
• Clearing and settlement cooperatives are more likely to be observed
when scope economies in these services are more extensive than scope
economies in trade execution. Exchange ownership stakes in the co-
operative economizes on the transactions costs of this form of organi-
zation.
• Although in theory an incumbent integrated exchange can exploit its
control of clearing to foreclose of entry into execution, if execution is
potentially highly competitive it has no incentive to do so. If execu-
tion is not highly competitive (due to network eﬀects, as is plausible)
then foreclosure can be eﬃcient because it prevents dissipative entry,
or superﬂuous, because the incumbent’s execution business is not vul-
nerable to entry even absent tie between clearing and execution.
• Historically, most exchanges that execute transactions in securities
or derivatives have integrated into clearing and settlement. Moreover,
when clearing and settlement entities are not wholly owned by a single
exchange, the exchanges they serve almost always have ownership and
voting stakes in them.
• Vertical integration remains the dominant form of organization in se-
curities and derivatives markets. There is only one prominent example
of an exchange that has no ownership in or control of its clearing and
settlement entity.
• Clearing and settlement cooperatives serve some markets. These co-
operatives typically provide services to multiple exchanges (and some-
4times over-the-counter markets) where transactions are executed. Ex-
changes typically have an ownership stake in these ﬁrms.
In sum, as transactions cost economics inspired-theory predicts, ex-
changes that execute ﬁnancial transactions typically exercise considerable
ownership and control over clearing and settlement. Only where economies
of scope in clearing and settlement are substantially more extensive than
economies of scope in execution have exchanges’ control over these func-
tions diminished.
The organization of the trading of securities (and to a lesser degree
derivatives) has been a subject of enduring controversy. The network na-
ture of liquidity means that ﬁnancial trading faces many of the same chal-
lenges and conundrums as other industries, such as telecommunications and
electricity, where network eﬀects are also present (and more widely recog-
nized) (Pirrong 2002a, 2005). Clearing and settlement contribute additional
sources of scale and scope economies that further challenge competition in
ﬁnancial markets. As in any network industry, there are no easy organiza-
tional answers. Suﬃce it to say that there are strong economic reasons to
integrate trade execution, clearing, and settlement, and these functions have
been commonly integrated in practice. Although this integration is unlikely
to produce a ﬁrst best outcome, because the integrated entity is likely to
exercise market power, alternative forms of organization do not obviously
increase competition appreciably, and plausibly create other distortions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the clearing and settlement of securities and derivatives transactions. Sec-
tion 3 analyzes the economics of trade execution, clearing and settlement,
and demonstrates that there are extensive scale and scope economies in
each of these functions. This section also examines how these scale and
5scope economies aﬀect the eﬃcient organization of execution, clearing, and
settlement. It also analyzes vertical foreclosure. Section 4 presents historical
evidence relating to the organization of ﬁrms engaged in trade execution,
clearing, and settlement. Section 5 brieﬂy summarizes the article.
2 Trade Execution, Clearing, and Settlement
The completion of a ﬁnancial transaction typically involves a variety of com-
plementary activities.
The ﬁrst function is the execution of a transaction; that is, the consum-
mation of an agreement between a buyer and a seller. In over-the-counter
markets, buyer and seller typically complete deals over the phone. In ex-
change markets, orders to buy and sell are directed to a central marketplace–
the exchange. In a traditional ﬂoor-based, open outcry exchange, orders to
buy or sell are represented by agents (ﬂoor brokers) on the exchange ﬂoor,
or by exchange members physically present on the exchange dealing on their
own account. Buyers and sellers (or their agents) on the exchange ﬂoor agree
to the terms of a transaction through a negotiation or auction process. In
newer, computerized exchanges, orders are routed electronically to a central
computer which matches buy and sell orders based on priority algorithms.
Once the buyer and seller agree to terms, a transaction must be cleared.
The clearer ﬁrst veriﬁes that all terms submitted by the buyer and seller
match. In most centralized markets, the clearing entity is then substituted
as a principal to the transaction, becoming the buyer to the seller, and the
seller to the buyer. That is, the clearer becomes the central counterparty
(“CCP”) that bears the risk of default by those with whom it transacts.2
2This process is somewhat intricate. See Edwards (1983) or Pirrong (2006) for detailed
6That is, CCPs bear performance risk.
In their role as CCP, clearers–typically referred to as “clearinghouses”–
engage in a variety of activities, including: calculation and collection of
collateral (margin); determination of settlement obligations (that is, the
determination of what each party owes or is owed in money and delivery
obligations); determination of default; collection from defaulting parties;
and remuneration of participants in the event of a default. The CCP usually
nets the obligations of those for whom it clears. That is, it determines the
net amount each part owes or is owed; since a party may owe money on
some transactions, and be owed money on others, netting typically reduces
the ﬂows of cash (and securities) between transacting parties. As will be
seen, this netting function is economically very important.3
Clearers service the ﬁnancial intermediaries who broker customer orders,
and who sometimestrade on theirown account. That is, clearinghouses serve
as a central counterparty only to so-called “clearing brokers,” and collect
margins, collect and disburse variation payments, and charge fees from/to
these brokers. They typically do not deal directly with the ultimate buyers
or sellers for whom the brokerage ﬁrms serve as agents.
Settlement is the process whereby parties discharge their contractual
obligations to pay cash or deliver securities.4 At one time, settlement agents
descriptions of this “novation” process. Not all organized exchanges have CCPs. CCPs
have been widespread in derivatives markets since the late-19th and early-20th centuries,
but have been introduced in equity markets only more recently.
3See The Optimal Structure for Clearing and Settlement in the EU: Citigroup Reponse
to the Communication on Clearing and Settlement from the European Commission for a
detailed description of clearing. Some non-CCP clearinghouses also engage in netting.
4Some derivatives transactions involve the delivery of securities or ﬁnancial instru-
ments. For instance, a corn futures contract not previously oﬀset is settled by the delivery
7facilitated the physical delivery of stock certiﬁcates, bonds, or other delivery
instruments. Presently, delivery is performed by debiting or crediting the
securities and cash accounts of the counterparties to transactions. This
typically involves the maintenance of a central register that records ultimate
ownership of securities.
A securities or derivatives transaction involves all three functions. Thus,
these functions are complementary, and the demand for each service is a
derived demand. This has important implications for the organization of
ﬁnancial markets, as is discussed in the next section.
3 Scale and Scope Economies in Trading, Clearing
and Settlement
3.1 Scale Economies in Trading: The Liquidity Network
The execution of transactions in ﬁnancial instruments (including securities
and derivatives) is subject to substantial economies of scale due to the nature
of liquidity. It is typically cheaper to execute transactions in markets where
large numbers of other transactors congregate.
There are a variety of formal models that demonstrate that trading of
ﬁnancial instruments is subject to network economies that cause average
trading costs to decline with the number of traders.5 These trading costs
include the bid-ask spread and the price impact of trades. Moreover, the
of a shipping certiﬁcate; at one time it was settled by delivery of a warehouse receipt. As
another example, Treasury note or bond futures contracts not previously oﬀset are settled
by delivery of a United States Treasury security.
5Pirrong, (1995), Pagano (1989), Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988), Economides and Siow
(1988).
8extant empirical evidence is consistent with these predictions.6
Informed trading is the crucial source of these network economies. In-
formed trading imposes adverse selection costs on those who do not possess
private information. The uninformed mitigate their exposure to adverse
selection by congregating on a single trading venue.
These models imply that the trading of ﬁnancial instruments is “tippy.”
That is, trading activity in a particular instrument should gravitate to a
single platform or exchange. With multiple exchanges, the exchange with
the larger number of participants exhibits lower trading costs. This attracts
traders from the smaller exchanges, which exacerbates the cost disparities,
attracting yet more defections to the larger venue. Absent strong clien-
tele eﬀects, in equilibrium this process results in the survival of a single
exchange.7
Empirical evidence is consistent with this tipping hypothesis (Pirrong,
1999, 2002). In practice, it is known that sometimes trading in ﬁnancial in-
struments (notably equities) fragments, with a given security being traded
on several venues. However, I have shown theoretically that this fragmen-
tation is typically a form of “cream skimming” whereby orders submitted
by those who are veriﬁably uninformed are executed oﬀ-exchange, while
all orders that are not veriﬁably uninformed are submitted to a dominant
exchange (Pirrong, 2002). For instance, oﬀ-exchange block trading mech-
anisms attempt to screen out the informed traders and limit participation
to those whom are unlikely to have private information about valuations.
6Pirrong, (2006b) summarizes this evidence.
7Cross-border trading restrictions are one potential source of clientele eﬀects. In the
days before eﬃcient telegraphic or telephonic communication, geographic proximity gave
rise to clienteles. Arnold, Hersch, Mulherin, and Netter (1999).
9Extensive empirical evidence shows that trades executed away from the pri-
mary exchange typically have less information content than those executed
on the primary exchange.8 Thus, theory and empirical evidence suggest that
trading activity that is not veriﬁably uninformed tips to a single venue. Put
diﬀerently, price discovery is a natural monopoly.
Potential competition is unliely to discipline strongly the market power
of the natural monopoly in the trading of a particular product. Exchanges
must incur sunk costs in speciﬁc assets to enter. A traditional open outcry
(ﬂoor) exchange must construct a specialized trading facility that has no use
other than that for which it is designed. Moreover, ﬂoor traders invest in
speciﬁc human capital that is of little use in other professions. Modern elec-
tronic exchanges create specialized trading systems involving investments
in hardware and (especially) software that has little (if any) value in other
uses. In addition, the customers of electronic exchanges invest in linkages
customized to a particular exchange to connect it. Thus, both open out-
cry and computerized trading exchanges incur sunk costs, and customers
incur costs to switch exchanges. Finally, for both open outcry and elec-
tronic exchanges, to compete on liquidity an entrant must attract the near
simultaneous defection of a large number of traders on an incumbent ex-
change. Coordinating this movement is costly, and these coordination costs
are sunk once incurred (Pirrong 1995). Sunk costs in physical trading in-
frastructure and human capital, switching costs, and coordination costs, all
impair the ability of an entrant to compete with an incumbent monopoly
trade execution venue.
8Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997), Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1996), Smith, Turn-
bull, and White (2001). Recently, intermediaries hae created “dark pools” of liquidity
that match orers at prices determined in other markets. These dark pools also serve as
cream skimming venues.
103.2 Scale Economies in Clearing and Settlement: The Single
Product Case
There are a variety of sources of scale economies in clearing and settlement.
With respect to clearing, there are operational scale economies, and impor-
tantly, economies of scale in bearing default risk.
To understand the sources of scale economies in bearing default risk, ﬁrst
consider a simple model of a one-product market. A major cost of operating
the clearing system is the capital the CCP requires to absorb defaults and
thereby insure performance on non-defaulting contracts.9 A clearinghouse
is able to ensure that all contracting parties that are “in the money” receive
what they are owed as long as its capital is larger than the losses from
defaults by holders of contracts that are “out of the money.” This capital
is costly. A simple formal model demonstrates that the amount of capital
required to ensure the clearinghouse’s performance in response to a given set
of defaults is subadditive. That is, the amount of capital required to ensure
that one clearinghouse performs is smaller than the amount of capital that
is required to ensure performance by two or more clearinghouses serving
the same set of customers and (collectively) experiencing the same set of
defaults.
To see this, consider ﬁrst the case with several clearinghouses. At time
0 clearinghouse i is the central counterparty to transactions with customers
j =1 ,...,N. These deals all mature (expire) at time 1. At time 1, customer
j pays to or receives from clearinghouse i an amount given by the random
variable ˜ vij.I f˜ vij > 0, the customer owes the clearinghouse money (because
the price has moved against this trader); if ˜ vij < 0 the clearinghouse owes
9Barzel (1997) argues that the role of equity capital is to bond the performance of
contracts. It deﬁnitely serves this purpose in clearing.
11the customer. At time 1, customer j has equity (gross of his obligations to
clearinghouse i) equal to the random variable ˜ Vj ≥ 0. The clearinghouse
receives the entire contractual payment only if ˜ Vj ≥ ˜ vij.I f˜ Vj < ˜ vij,t h e
customer cannot pay what he owes, so the clearinghouse receives ˜ Vj instead
of the full contractual amount. Thus, the payoﬀ to the clearinghouse in his
dealings with customer j is min[˜ vij, ˜ Vj]. Note that the payoﬀ to the contract
with customer j is an option on the minimum of two risky assets.
At time 1 clearinghouse i has capital given by the random variable ˜ Ei,
and the clearinghouse owes payments to counterparties on deals such that
˜ vik < 0. (Note that min[˜ vik, ˜ Vk]=˜ vik < 0 for such deals.)
All counterparties with contracts that are “in the money” receive full
payment from the clearinghouse if and only if:
˜ Zi =
N 
j=1
min[˜ vij, ˜ Vj]+ ˜ Ei ≥ 0( 1 )
If this inequality does not hold, the clearinghouse defaults. In this case, all
customers with vij < 0 receive less than the full contractual payment.
Consider another clearinghouse h that transacts with customers k =
1,...,Kat time 0. This clearinghouse does not default if:
˜ Zh =
K 
k=1
min[˜ vhk, ˜ Vk]+ ˜ Eh ≥ 0( 2 )
Now consider the losses from default when i and h merge. No customer of
the merged clearinghouse who is owed money receives less than full payment
if:
N 
j=1
min[˜ vij, ˜ Vj]+ ˜ Ei +
K 
k=1
min[˜ vhk, ˜ Vk]+ ˜ Eh ≥ 0( 3 )
It is readily evident that there are some states of the world (i.e., some
possible realizations of {˜ vij, ˜ vhk, ˜ Vj, ˜ Vk, ˜ Ei, ˜ Eh}) such that (3) holds, but (1),
12(2), or both do not, i.e., (1)and (2) are suﬃcient, but not necessary, for (3)to
hold. In essence, default costs are subadditive. Losses from a clearinghouse
default have the characteristics of the payoﬀ to an option on a portfolio. The
default costs of N separate clearinghouses equal the value of N of options
on N portfolios. The default costs if the N clearinghouses merge are the
same as the payoﬀ on single option on the N portfolios. The subadditivity
in default costs obtains because an option on a portfolio is less costly than
a portfolio of options (Merton, 1973). Therefore, due to the non-linearity
of the clearinghouse payoﬀ function, customers lose from defaults in fewer
states of the world if the clearinghouses merge.
Equivalently, merger reduces the amount of equity capital required to
generate the same expected customer loss from clearinghouse default that
would be incurred with multiple clearinghouses serving the same set of cus-
tomers. Thus, just as there are network eﬀects in trade execution, there are
network eﬀects in clearing as well; the more customers that join a particular
clearing “network,” the lower that network’s costs.
There are other sources of scale economies in clearing. In particular, a
clearer must create the necessary software and information technology in-
frastructure. The software investment in particular exhibits scale economies.
Moreover, maintenance and operation of the clearing IT does not vary
strongly with the number of transactions cleared.
The creation of multiple clearers for the same instrument imposes addi-
tional costs. Multiple clearers must maintain costly communication links to
match transactions when the counterparties submit trade details to diﬀerent
clearinghouses. They must also maaintain ﬁnancial linkages to permit the
ﬂow of cash between counterparties who use diﬀerent clearers. The number
of communication and banking linkages, and hence the costs thereof, rise
13geometrically with the number of clearing ﬁrms. Multiple clearers also re-
quire costly collateral to bond performance with one another. Inter-clearer
margin would be unnecessary with a single clearinghouse.
Settlement costs are also largely ﬁxed. As with clearing, settlement re-
quires the creation of a software and hardware infrastructure, both of which
(especially software) involve a large ﬁxed component.10 Econometric anal-
ysis also documents large scale economies in settlement (Schmeidel, Malka-
maki, Tarkka, 2002). Multiple settlement entities also necessarily create and
maintain costly communications and ﬁnancial linkages, and require costly
collateral to bond settlement performance risk.
3.3 The Organizational Implications of Sale Economies in
Trading and Post-Trade Operations
As noted in section 3.1, execution of transactions in a particular ﬁnancial in-
strument is subject to strong network/liquidity-driven scale economies, and
that as a result there are strong natural monopoly tendencies in trading.
Similarly, the analysis of scale economies in clearing and settlement strongly
suggests that these functions are also natural monopolies. Operational ef-
fects, liquidity economies from netting, and perhaps most importantly, de-
fault cost eﬀects all exhibit strong scale economies. Costs are higher with
multiple clearinghouses than with a single clearinghouse.
These cost factors inﬂuence the eﬃciency of alternative forms of orga-
nizing ﬁnancial transactions. One such alternative is for separate ﬁrms to
perform the trade execution, clearing, and settlement functions, and for
these ﬁrms to be organized as for-proﬁt ventures.
10One major European settlement entity, CREST, estimated the cost of establishing a
settlement depository at GBP 100 million.
14If (a) clearers are separate from exchanges, and (b) multiple clearers
attempt to compete, in equilibrium only one clearinghouse survives. The
bigger clearinghouse can always undercut the smaller one’s prices, and at-
tract all of the latter’s customers. This induces tipping of clearing to a single
provider.
Nor is potential competition likely to constrain severely the natural
monopoly clearer. Much of the clearer’s costs are sunk. For instance, the in-
formation systems (which represent a large fraction of the clearer’s costs) are
specialized to the clearing function, and have little value in alternative uses.
Moreover, a particular clearer creates a unique interface through which it
interacts with customers. Customers incur costs to connect to this interface,
and incur switching costs to connect to a new clearer. These customer costs
are sunk once incurred. As with trade execution, moreover, a challenger
to an incumbent monopoly clearer must coordinate the near-simultaneous
defection of the incumbent’s customers to overcome the latter’s scale ad-
vantage; these costs are also sunk once incurred. These sunk costs (those
incurred by the clearing ﬁrm and its customers) give the incumbent clearing
monopoly competitive advantages over those attempting to supplant them.
Competitionin a natural monopoly service like clearing is plausibly mod-
eled as a war of attrition. This competition is dissipative. Scale economies
are not fully exploited and ﬁxed costs are duplicated, and monopoly pricing
is the ultimate outcome. (Tirole, 1988.)
The same dynamic prevails at the settlement level. Again, sunk costs
and coordination problems sharply constrain potential competition, likely
permitting the settlement monopoly to exercise market power.
Thus, if clearing, settlement, and trade execution are supplied by ﬁrms
that specialize in a single function, the strong scale economies in each tend to
15result in the survival of a single ﬁrm in each function, each of which has some
market power. Moreover, competition for these monopolies can wastefully
dissipate market power rents. Due to the aforementioned complementarityof
clearing, settlement, and execution, separate ownership, control, and pricing
of these functions therefore creates a tri-lateral monopoly problem. This, in
turn, creates the potential for ineﬃciencies.
First, due to complementarity, multiple-marginalization problems arise.
Independent price setting by the three ﬁrms results in a price that exceeds
the monopoly price that an integrated monopoly ﬁrm would charge.
Second, even if the exchange, clearer, and settlement agent enter into a
contract (or set of contracts) that prices each ﬁrm’s services in a way that
avoids multiple-marginalization and ensures that the ultimate customer of
ﬁnancial transaction services pays the monopoly price (which maximizes the
rent to be divided between the three entities), wasteful rent seeking and op-
portunism can arise. Recall that each entity employs speciﬁc capital, and
that this capital is likely to be quite durable. These considerations lock the
(putatively separate) suppliers of execution, clearing, and settlement ser-
vices into long term, trilateral relationships. Due to the enduring nature
of the relationships, the parties are likely to rely on long term contracts to
govern their interactions. However, the speciﬁc assets of the clearer, ex-
change, and settlement ﬁrm give rise to quasi rents, and each ﬁrm has the
incentive to engage in ex post opportunism to expropriate them. That is,
even if the parties sign long term contracts, they have an incentive to violate
the contract or evade performance in order to expropriate these quasi rents.
Unpredictability in the economic environment makes complete contracts im-
possible, and parties can exploit this incompleteness in an attempt to proﬁt
at the expense of their contracting partners. This rent seeking utilizes real
16resources.
Integration of the complementary trading functions abolishes the dead-
weightlosses arisingfrom multi-marginalizationand opportunism. Although
integration does not result in a ﬁrst best outcome (because the integrated
entity is a monopoly, and presumably charges supermarginal cost prices) it
oﬀers some advantages over a dis-integrated structure because it avoids the
costs associated with ineﬃcient pricing and rent seeking. It can also adapt
to unpredictable changes in conditions, such as technology or regulatory
shocks, that challenge contractual governance of the relationships between
distinct execution, clearing, and settlement ﬁrms.
This is not to say that vertical integration is free. Due to their inabil-
ity to precommit to a high powered incentive system, integrated divisions
are typically operated subject to low powered compensation schemes that
attenuate incentives to reduce costs and innovate. Moreover, information
asymmetries between managers give rise to costly information rents and the
use of low powered incentives.
Thus, standard transactions cost considerations imply that integration
of trade execution, clearing, and settlement oﬀers increases the rents to be
split, makes consumers better oﬀ, and reduces deadweight losses due to the
elimination of double marginalization and opportunism. Thus, integration
is plausibly a second-best response to the natural monopoly characteristics
of trading, clearing, and settlement.
Although vertical integration is a well-recognized way to mitigate trans-
actional hazards, there are other ways to organize ﬁrms and to govern rela-
tionships between them in order to control transactions costs in the presence
of small-numbers and speciﬁc asset problems such as those inherent in trade
execution, clearing, and settlement.
17For instance, a user cooperative can eliminate multiple marginalization
problems; consumer cooperatives are a well-known response to market power
(Hannsman, 1996).11 Recall that brokerage ﬁrms utilize clearing services.
These brokerages can form a cooperative ﬁrm that supplies clearing.12
Formally, consider a set of brokerage ﬁrms i =1 ,...,N that form a
clearing cooperative. The ﬁxed cost of the clearing service is F and the
marginal cost is cc,ac o n s t a n t . 13 The clearing cooperative charges member
broker a ﬁxed membership fee of fi,a n daf e eo fPc per trade cleared. The
cooperative pays its members a patronage dividend of Pc −cc on each trade
cleared. Moreover, it chooses the ﬁxed fees so that total ﬁxed payments
just equal the ﬁxed cost of operating the clearinghouse. Moreover, I assume
that the cooperative chooses the fi to maximize the number of brokers that
participate, subject to the constraint that the cooperative covers its ﬁxed
costs. Thus, the cooperative operates on the open access principle, and just
breaks even.
Clearing and execution services are consumed in the ﬁxed proportion of
one-to-one (an extreme case of complementarity.) The demand for trading
services is D(Q), where Q is the quantity of trades executed and cleared.
Brokers process and manage customer trades for execution and clearing.
Broker i incurs a cost Ci(q) to process q trades, with C 
i > 0, C  
i > 0. There
is a monopoly execution venue. For simplicity, the marginal cost of trade
execution is zero.
11Hausman, Leonard, and Tirole, (2003) presents a model showing how a non-proﬁt
cooperative can induce an eﬃcient outcome in a network industry.
12A similar argument can be applied to clearing, or to execution.
13This is for convenience only. The model can be extended readily to permit cc to be a
(decreasing) function of the size of the clearing network.
18The monopoly execution venue chooses its price PE. Since execution
and clearing are consumed in ﬁxed proportions, the derived demand for
brokerage services is DB(Q): =D(Q) − PE.
Brokers are perfect competitors who take the price of brokerage services
PB as given. Each broker i chooses the quantity of transactions to clear qi
to maximize:
Πi = PBqi − Ci(qi) − qiPC + qi(PC − cc) − fi (4)
= PBqi − Ci(qi) − qicc − fi (5)
The fourth term on the right hand side of (4) is the patronage dividend
received by broker i; note that due to this dividend, each broker acts as if
the price of clearing services is marginal cost.
Given the exchange’s choice of PE, in the competitive equilibrium
PB = C 
i(qi)+cc = DB(
N 
i=1
qi)
where C 
i(qi)=C (qj), for all i,j. Consequently, when determining its
price (or equivalently, its output), the execution venue perceives its de-
rived demand to be the diﬀerence between market demand for trade exe-
cution/clearing and the marginal cost of clearing (including the marginal
costs that brokers incur to process trades). This implies that the exchange
chooses the same output as if it were to integrate into clearing. Thus, the co-
operative alternative eliminates double marginalization, just as integration
does.
This does not mean that this alternativeis as eﬃcient as, or more eﬃcient
than, integration. Several potential problems arise, including:
• The clearing cooperative cannot internalize all beneﬁts from invest-
ments to improve productivity or improve service quality because some
19of these beneﬁts accrue to the monopoly exchange. For instance, if the
cooperative invests in technology to reduce cc, and this investment is
non-contractable, the exchange’s derived demand rises. In response,
the exchange raises the price of execution, thereby capturing some
of the cost reduction. This reduces at the margin the cooperative’s
incentives to invest, and leads to underinvestment.
• The foregoing analysis assumes that (a) the cooperative implements
an open access policy, and (b) PB is set competitively, that is, the
cooperative does not enforce a broker cartel. Both assumptions are
subject to challenge. For instance, the New York Stock Exchange
and other ﬁnancial exchanges were non-proﬁt mutuals that enforced
broker cartels that set minimum commissions and restricted entry by
limiting the number of memberships.14 Elsewhere I show that a coop-
erative natural monopoly ﬁrm can exercise market power, and allow
its members to earn economic rents, by restricting membership. In
these models, a particular service is subject to increasing returns.15 A
coalition of suppliers forms a cooperative that performs this service for
its members. The cooperative charges these members a fee just suﬃ-
cient to cover the ﬁxed cost that gives rise to the scale economy. The
members then compete for customers (those who need to clear transac-
tions, in this instance). Due to the presence of scale economies, there
14Philipson and Posner (2001), and Hansmann (1996) argue that even non-proﬁts may
exercise market power even though they cannot distribute proﬁts to their owners. For
instance, they can charge supracompetitive prices for goods over which they have market
power, and use the resulting proﬁts to subsidize the production of other goods for their
owner-members.
15In Pirrong (1999) the increasing returns arise from a ﬁxed cost. In Pirrong (2002),
network eﬀects create a scale economy.
20is a critical size of membership that is (a) smaller than optimal, but
(b) just large enough so that any other competing cooperative is too
small to cover its ﬁxed costs. Due to its smaller than optimal mem-
bership, the cooperative’s output is ineﬃciently small; this eﬀectively
results in double marginalization. Thus, to avoid this possibility, it is
necessary to constrain the cooperative’s ability to limit membership.
This is not a straightforward task, as in the case of clearing and set-
tlement (which involve mutualization of some risks) it is economically
sound to impose ﬁnancial requirements on members to mitigate moral
hazard and adverse selection problems; it is no mean feat to determine
whether a given ﬁnancial requirement is justiﬁed as a prudent way to
maintain the solvency of the clearing and settlement ﬁrm, or is instead
set ineﬃciently high in order to restrict membership. Moreover, due
to the complementarity of trade execution and clearing, when decid-
ing on the proﬁt maximizing membership, the cooperative ignores the
impact of the resultant output restriction on the derived demand for
the execution venue’s services; this causes a double marginalization
ineﬃciency.16
16The form of the cooperative’s payout policy is also important. The formal model in the
text assumes that a brokerage receives a rebate only on its purchases of clearing services.
The appendix presents another model in which each broker receives a ﬁxed fraction of the
diﬀerence between the clearing cooperative’s revenues and its costs. This would be the
case where the clearing ﬁrm is a for-proﬁt ﬁrm owned by the brokers where the equity
share of each broker is ﬁxed. In this case, each broker’s payout depends on the output
of the others. The model also assumes Cournot competition between the brokers. In this
case, setting PC above marginal cost aﬀects the output of the brokerage ﬁrms, which is not
true when the patronage dividend depends only each broker’s own output. The appendix
demonstrates that it is possible to choose the shares accruing to each broker and PC >c c
to produce the monopoly outcome (conditional on the execution venue’s choice of price
PE). Thus, the for proﬁt cooperative can facilitate collusion between the brokers. This
is a result similar to the well-known ﬁnding that a revenue pool (perhaps run by a joint
sales oﬃce) can implement a monopoly outcome. This results in double marginalization.
21• Separation of trade execution and post-trade services can impede coor-
dination. For instance, a change in a trading or clearing system (such
as the addition of a new product for trading, or the oﬀering of a new
clearing or trading functionality such as straight-through processing)
often requires changes to both the clearing and trading systems. The
incentives to adopt eﬃcient changes may not be well aligned when
trade execution and post-trade services are carried out by diﬀerent
ﬁrms. Similarly, sometimes there is a need to coordinate responses to
shocks (such as a market crash) or regulatory changes. Implementa-
tion of such changes requires negotiation across ﬁrm boundaries, which
can provide an opportunity for hold up to extract the quasi rents that
arise from speciﬁc investments. This impairs incentives to introduce
eﬃciency-enhancing innovations or to respond eﬃciently to shocks.
• Eﬀectively operating as a non-proﬁt, the clearing ﬁrm’s management
is subject to low-powered incentives.
• If the clearing entity cannot ﬁnance ﬁxed costs through the use of ﬁxed
assessments (due to information asymmetries, for instance), and there-
fore must charge a per unit fee PC >c c, there is double marginalization
as the clearer’s markup over marginal cost drives the exchange’s de-
rived demand for execution services below that which prevails under
integration.
A vertically integrated exchange is not vulnerable to expropriation of
the returns to investment, or to holdups that impede coordination. The
integrated exchange has no incentive to limit brokerage participation in the
clearinghouse for strategic purposes, as this reduces the derived demand for
its services. On ap r i o r igrounds it is not possible to determine whether in-
22centive power is weaker in an integrated exchange than with an (eﬀectively)
non-proﬁt clearer. However, on balance, unless the costs of low powered
incentives for an integrated ﬁrm are substantially higher than for the post-
trade processor, integration dominates supply of post-trade services by a
cooperative.
These problems with the cooperative solution can mitigated by extend-
ing control and ownership rights in the cooperative to the exchange. That
is, shared governance–partial integration–is one means of attenuating the
transactions costs associated with the separation of trade execution and
post-execution service providers.
In sum, although a verticallyintegrated exchange that oﬀers trade execu-
tion, clearing, and settlement services does not result in a ﬁrst best outcome,
alternative arrangements in which clearing and settlement are separated
from execution incur deadweight costs as well. These alternatives might
have some merit, as compared to vertical integration, to the extent that
regulation or cooperative ownership of one segment of the industry (such
as clearing and settlement) facilitates competition in another (such as trade
execution), and even then only to the extent that the associated eﬃciency
gains outweigh any eﬃciency losses that arise in a disintegrated industry.17
However, in the case of ﬁnancial transactions, each of the three segments
of the industry has strong natural monopoly elements. The creation of a
clearing cooperative, for instance, does not eliminate the centripetal force
of liquidity that gives exchanges that execute exchanges considerable mar-
ket power. Thus, a clearing/settlement cooperative does not eliminate the
17This is arguably the case in electricity, where transmission is arguably a natu-
ral monopoly but generation is plausibly competitive. Nonetheless, as documented in
Michaels (2003), vertical disintegration in electricity has not led to obvious improvements
in welfare, and may indeed have impaired eﬃciency.
23liquidity-based market power of a trade execution venue, but incurs costs
from low powered incentives, weak incentives to reduce costs, or entry re-
strictions, or some combination thereof; again, this arrangement is prefer-
able to integration only if these costs are lower than the transactions costs
(arising from low power incentives, for instance) incurred by the integrated
ﬁrm.18
3.4 Scope Economies
There are strong scope economies in clearing and settlement. There are
also sources of scope economies in trade execution. These scope economies
inﬂuence the eﬃcient organization of ﬁnancial trading.
The analysis of section 3.2 can be interpreted to demonstrate that a
combination of multiple clearinghouses, each clearing a distinct set of prod-
ucts, reduces the capital necessary to generate the same level of customer
loss to default. There are other sources of scope economies in clearing. For
instance, clearinghouses universally use collateralization–“margin”–to bond
contract performance. I now demonstrate that the total amount of mar-
gin required to achieve a given risk of default for a particular customer is
smaller if multiple products are cleared together, with gains and losses be-
ing net across all of that customer’s positions. That is, netting reduces the
deadweight costs of collateral, and netting opportunities are greater, when
multiple products are cleared together.
First note that collateral is costly. Firms must post margin in cash
or other liquid instruments, and typically they must hold more of these
lower-yielding instruments than they would in the absence of a collateral
requirement; this lower yield is an opportunity cost of collateral. Call c the
18Competitive implications of integration are discussed in more detail in section 3.6.
24cost per unit of margin. Consider a customer who trades two products. The
customer’s cash ﬂow on product i =1 ,2 is the random variable xi,w h e r ea s
in section 3.2 xi > 0( xi < 0) means that the customer makes (receives) a
payment to (from) the clearinghouse. The customer must post margin mi
on product i.I tm a yb et h ec a s et h a txi−mi > 0. That is, the price on the
product may move so much that the customer’s margin is exhausted because
the payment he owes exceeds his collateral. In this case, the clearinghouse
must secure this margin shortfall from the customer. The customer may be
bankrupt, however, in which case the clearinghouse must draw on its own
capital to make whole those who have made money on contract i,o rm u s t
spend resources to obtain the additional funds from the customer. I assume
that covering a margin shortfall is costly. The cost of covering shortfall S is
f(S), where I assume only that f  > 0.19
Optimal choice of margin minimizes the sum of margin opportunity costs
plus the expected cost of shortfall. If products 1 and 2 are cleared separately,
total margin shortfall is:
SS =m a x [ x1 − m1,0] + max[x2 − m2,0]
and total expected cost of margin is:
CS = c(m1 + m2)+Ef(max[x1 − m1,0]+ max[x2 − m2,0])
With a single clearer for the two products, total margin shortfall is:
SI =m a x [ x1 + x2 − m1 − m2,0]
This expression reﬂects the ability to net gains and losses across the two
products. The single clearer’s total expected cost of margin is:
CI = c(m1 + m2)+Ef(max[x1 + x2 − m1 − m2,0])
19To account for aversion to shortfall risk, one may also assume f
 > 0.
25The appendix demonstrates that SS exhibits ﬁrst order stochastic dom-
inance over SI. This in turn implies that
Ef(max[x1 − m1,0] + max[x2 − m2,0]) >E f(max[x1 + x2 − m1 − m2,0])
Thus, for a given choice of margin (and hence the opportunity costs of
margin), expected margin shortfall costs are smaller with a single clearer.
Alternatively, the single clearer can achieve the same expected shortfall costs
with smaller m1+m2, and hence smaller opportunity cost, than can multiple
clearers. Thus, the ability to net across multiple positions reduces the costly
collateral required to achieve a given level of margin shortfall costs. This
creates a scope economy.
There are other sources of scope economies in clearing and settlement.
These include:
• Increasing the precision of information about risk. A clearinghouse
can only observe the positions in contracts it clears. Thus, if a cus-
tomer trades some contracts cleared by A and others cleared by B, A
will be ignorant of the customer’s positions at B,a n dvice versa. For
instance, if A clears product 1 and B clears product 2, A’s payoﬀ is
min[x1,˜ kx2+V ], where V is the customer’s equity, and ˜ k is the number
of units of product 2 the customer trades. Note that A does not know
˜ k if it clears only product 1. In contrast, if A clears both products,
it knows k, and receives a payoﬀ min[x1 + kx2,V]. The reduction in
information that results from clearing a subset of a customer’s posi-
tions imposes additional risks on the clearinghouse. A similar analysis
holds for clearinghouse B. Risk averse clearinghouses (and costly cap-
ital makes a clearinghouse risk averse) will demand compensation for
this additional risk. Consolidating clearing of multiple products into a
26single clearinghouse improves information, reduces this risk–and hence
reduces the associated compensations.
• Economizing on the need for cash. Participantsin the clearing and set-
tlement system typically have some trades on which they owe money,
and other trades on which they are owed money. Netting cash ﬂows
permits paying the net amount, reducing the amount of cash required
to meet obligations. This reduces the need for costly short term credit
and liquidity. Moreover, exceptional liquidity demands can create
systemic risks in the banking and payment system, so reducing the
need for liquidity concomittantly reduces settlement risks. Netting
economies are greater, the greater the set of products netted.
This economy can have systematic implications. For instance, in the
1987 stock market crash, some ﬁrms that had large losses on index
futures positions had large mark-to-market gains on index options po-
sitions. These products were cleared seperately, however, and hence
the gains on one position were not netted against the losses on the
other. The inability to net across positions increased these ﬁrms’ need
for cash to meet margin calls precisely at a time when the liquidity of
the banking system was strained (Tamarkin, 1993).
• System costs. The software and hardware necessary to eﬀect settle-
ment of one security is readily utilized to settle trades in other secu-
rities. Similarly, clearing systems (notably software) can be utilized
to clear a large number of instruments. Although hardware capac-
ity must increase with the number of instruments cleared and settled,
thereby increasing costs, system design and software costs are largely
invariant to the number of instruments cleared and settled.
27It should be noted that these clearing and settlement scope economies
extend to products that are traded on over-the-counter markets as well as ex-
change traded products. For instance, government bonds, corporate bonds,
and many derivatives are traded in OTC markets rather than on exchanges.
Moreover, these products are often intermediated by the same ﬁrms that
provide brokerage and account clearing services on exchange traded prod-
ucts. Clearing and settlement systems that service both exchange and OTC
markets can exploit the scope economies just identiﬁed.
There are also sources of scope economies in trade execution. Some
of these economies are more pronounced in computerized exchanges than
traditional ﬂoor-based markets, while others are more important in open
outcry markets.
In ﬂoor based markets, especially for derivatives, there are some economies
to executing transactions in diﬀerent instruments on the same trading ﬂoor.
For instance, spreading is an important trading activity in many markets.
As an example, in energy markets, the purchase of crude oil futures and
the simultaneous sale of gasoline or heating oil futures–a “crack spread”–is
a common trade. As another example, futures options traders often hedge
options positions with an oﬀsetting futures position–a “delta hedge.” These
transactions can be executed more rapidly and accurately when both “legs”
of the transaction are traded on the same ﬂoor. This creates an economy of
scope. As an illustration that this source of scope economy is more impor-
tant in open outcry environments, spread trading (especially during contract
rolls) and options hedges now accounts for most ﬂoor volume in ﬁnancial
futures contracts.
In electronic markets, a single computer trading system can handle trans-
actions in many instruments. Indeed, once the trading software is created,
28the cost of adding additional trading instruments is relatively small. More-
over, trading multiple instruments on a single platform reduces the costs
that customers who trade them incur to connect to the market. Typically,
users must create a customized interface for each exchange that they deal
with. Trading multiple instruments on a single platform, rather than several,
reduces the number of interfaces that customers must create and maintain.
Moreover, analogous to ﬂoor-based exchanges, it is typically easier to exe-
cute spread trades on a single system, than across systems.
3.5 Scope Economies and the Organization of Trading
If trade execution is subject to scope economies, or at least is not subject
to scope diseconomies, integration of a multi-product exchange with a multi-
product clearerand multi-productsettlingagentavoidsmulti-marginalization
and ex post opportunism problems. Thus, absent diseconomies of scope
in trading, the theory predicts the formation (through merger or organic
growth) of multi-product exchanges with integrated clearing and settlement,
rather than the existence of distinct execution, clearing, and settlement en-
tities. This arrangement mitigates transactions costs.
Matters become more complex if there are diseconomies of scope in trad-
ing, or if there is a constraint on merging exchanges that execute trades in
diﬀerent products.20 In this case, there is a trade-oﬀ. An integrated multi-
product exchange can realize scope economies in clearing and settlement,
but incurs costs due to scope diseconomies in execution. Whether integra-
20Pirrong (1999) shows that the mutual structures of traditional open outcry exchanges
impede consolidation even in the presence of economies of scope. Merger increases the
competition that members face, and as a result they may decline to merge even if merger
yields scope economies. Moreover, diﬀerences in law and regulation, or legal impediments,
often increase the costs of merging exchanges located in diﬀerent countries, and can pre-
clude such mergers altogether.
29tion remains the (second best) eﬃcient solution in this instance depends on
the relative costs of alternative arrangements.
One alternative is for the several exchanges to own jointly an entity that
clears and settles their transactions. This permits the realization of scope
economies in clearing and settlement, without incurring scope diseconomies
in trade execution, and avoiding double marginalization and opportunism
problems.
If it is eﬃcient for intermediaries to trade across a variety of exchanges,
or across exchange and OTC markets, another alternative is the formation
of an intermediary-owned cooperative that provides clearing and settlement
services for products traded on multiple execution venues. As noted above,
this solution incurs some costs that integration does not. These costs can be
mitigated by giving trade execution venues an ownership and control stake
in the clearing and settlement entity. The cooperative solution (perhaps
with exchange participation in governance) is more likely to be observed
when scope economies in post-trade services are more extensive than the
scope economies in execution. This, in turn, is more likely when ﬁnancial
ﬁrms eﬃciently supply intermediation services across a variety of centralized
and OTC markets.
3.6 Vertical Foreclosure
The foregoing analysis focuses on the eﬃciency enhancing aspects of inte-
gration of execution, clearing, and settlement. Concerns have been raised,
however, that integration is ineﬃcient because it can impede competition.
Speciﬁcally, the potential for an integrated exchange to foreclose entry into
execution by denying access to clearing lies at the heart of criticisms of ex-
30change mergers.21 In theory, by denying access to clearing (“tying” clearing
and execution) an incumbent integrated exchange can raise the costs that
another exchange incurs to compete in providing execution services.
The incentive to engage in strategic tying, and the eﬃciency eﬀects
thereof, depend on the nature of competition in execution. Putatively com-
petitive (marginal cost) pricing at one link of the value chain (such as, exe-
cution) just permits a monopoly at one of the other links (such as, clearing)
to capture the entire monopoly rent. Indeed, the natural monopolist of any
one service would prefer competition in the markets for the other services. If
the others are subject to scale diseconomies, for instance, vertical integration
and foreclosure/exclusion reduces the proﬁtability of the monopoly service.
Consequently, foreclosure is self-defeating if one of the complementary func-
tions is highly competitive (Posner, 1976; Bork, 1978). Thus, if execution
is potentially highly competitive, and clearing is a natural monopoly (as
some exchange integration critics argue) tying cannot have anti-competitive
eﬀects, and is instead motivated by reductions in transactions costs.
There are models in which ineﬃcient monopolizing foreclosure can oc-
cur.22 These models are not particularly applicable to the ﬁnancial trading
21Larry Harris, Breaking the Futures Monopoly, Forbes Magazine, November 6, 2006.
Meyer S. Frucher, Bearish on Chicago, Wall Street Journal, November 20, 2006. Both
argue that the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s control of clearing impede the entry of
competitive trade execution platforms, and both advocate the disintegration of clearing
and execution. Similar arguments have been made in Europe, particularly in criticism of
the integrated Deutsche B¨ orse. See the sources cited note 1 supra.
22Whinston (1990), Riordan (1998), Salop and Scheﬀman (1983). The Riordan model
applies to a market in which there is a dominant ﬁrm and competitive fringe. Cream
skimming competition has some features of a competitive fringe, although there are diﬀer-
ences. Moreover, in Riordan the upstream industry is competitive and not characterized
by extensive economies of scale which is not the case in clearing. Whinston (who analyzes
tying speciﬁcally, but who argues that a vertically integrated ﬁrm that refuses to deal with
a competitor is equivalent to tying) shows that anticompetitive vertical restrictions is not
31context because they typically do not assume network economies (or other
pervasive scale and scope economies) at multiple levels of the marketing
chain.
Carlton and Waldman’s (2002) model of foreclosure in a network indus-
try comes closest to capturing some–but not all–of the salient features of
ﬁnancial markets. In particular, it includes network economies in one of the
complementary goods in the model economy (though not in both.) Due to
this feature, competition in this good is imperfect, which can distort the in-
centives to enter; due to the natural monopoly arising from network eﬀects
and lock-in, the entrant earns a rent that may exceed the social value of
entry.
The Appendix presents a model that alters Carlton-Waldman to make
it more reﬂective of conditions in ﬁnancial exchange markets. In particular,
whereas Carlton-Waldman model competition in the market for a durable
good subject to network economies, trading services are not durable. There-
fore, the model invokes diﬀerent sources of the customer lock in that is crucial
to the Carlton-Waldman results. Moreover, the model focuses on execution-
only entry because most critics of integration argue that clearing is a natural
monopoly, and that the most eﬃcient form of competition is from execution-
only venues; in contrast, Carlton-Waldman assume that the good that the
complementary good (clearing, in this interpretation) is produced subject
to constant returns to scale, and is therefore potentially perfectly compet-
proﬁtable in the standard ﬁxed proportions case even when there are increasing returns
to scale. These conditions are particularly applicable in the execution-clearing-settlement
situation. Hart and Tirole (1990) shows that integration that reduces output can occur
when a ﬁrm cannot commit to limit output because price information is non-public. In
most of these models, a ﬁrm must be able to commit to a tie. Whinston, for instance,
argues that a ﬁrm can commit to a tie through product design. Such physical ties are not
feasible in the ﬁnancial market context.
32itive. Furthermore, Carlton-Waldman impose an exogenous restriction on
integrated entry that is not plausible in an exchange context, so the model
also explores the economics of entry by integrated ﬁrms.23
The model retains salient features of Carlton-Waldman, however. Specif-
ically, the execution market is subject to network economies, and tips to the
most eﬃcient supplier of execution services. This ﬁrm earns an economic
rent that arises from the natural monopoly aspect of trade execution. If
a ﬁrm enters the execution market only, and the incumbent sells clearing
services (that is, it does not tie clearing and execution), the two ﬁrms split a
market power rent. If the incumbent ties, it can foreclose execution-only en-
try, but may face entry by an integrated ﬁrm. Moreover, the entrant incurs
ﬁxed costs; these can be viewed as representing the costs of creating execu-
tion or clearing systems, or of coordinating the defection of the incumbent’s
customers.
The main results of the analysis are:
• An integrated incumbent sometimes has an incentive to tie clearing
and execution to deter execution-only entry.
• Although for some parameterizationstying deters eﬃcient entry, some-
times foreclosing entry is eﬃcient because entry is dissipative. Because
of imperfect competition in execution, the entrant earns a rent. As a
result, the private returns to entry may exceed the social value of entry.
• The entrant may decide to enter both clearing and execution markets,
and tie provision of these services, even when this is ineﬃcient. The
ability to capture the rent that the monopoly clearer would retain in
23As an example, two of the (failed) entrants into US futures markets (Eurex and
Euronext.LIFFE)
33the event of execution-only entry can make entry into both clearing
and execution proﬁtable even when it is ineﬃcient.
In sum, the eﬀects of tying are ambiguous even when one ignores the
transaction costs eﬃciencies of integration. The rent captured by the en-
trant into execution means that entry can be overcompensatory. Conse-
quently, even if foreclosure occurs, one cannot determine ap r i o r ithat this
is ineﬃcient because the network eﬀect-induced imperfection of competition
in execution distorts entry incentives.24
Thus, although foreclosure through the tie-in of clearing and execution
of an incumbent exchange is theoretically possible, it is not possible to de-
termine ap r i o r ithat this foreclosure is ineﬃcient; indeed, foreclosure can
enhance eﬃciency, and the conditions under which this result obtains plausi-
bly hold in ﬁnancial trading markets. If trade execution is potentially highly
competitive, foreclosure is not a proﬁtable strategy; the clearing monopolist
can extract all the rent by pricing clearing services appropriately, and actu-
ally has an incentive to encourage entry by a more eﬃcient execution venue.
Conversely, if competition in execution is imperfect due to network eﬀects
(as argued above), foreclosure may be eﬃcient because entry is dissipative.
Put diﬀerently, the natural monopoly aspects in trade execution that arise
from network eﬀects undermine traditional arguments opposing foreclosure
24If the execution market is perfectly competitive because it is not subject to network
economies, in Carlton-Waldman the clearing monopolist has no incentive to tie clearing
and execution services if the entrant can enter only the execution business. This result is
similar to the classic Director-Posner-Bork theories discussed above. The incumbent may
tie if the entrant can supply clearing in the second period. Critics of integration of clearing
and execution argue that but for the tying of these services, execution is potentially highly
competitive, but that clearing is a natural monopoly service that is prohibitively expensive
to enter. That is, they discount the importance of network eﬀects in execution and assert
that execution-only exchanges are the most likely entrants. If these conjectures are correct,
however, per Carlton-Waldman integration and tying are benign, and the incumbent has
no incentive to use them to foreclose execution-only entry.
34through integration, or alternatively suggest that integration is not adopted
as part of a foreclosure strategy, but instead has an eﬃciency rationale.
Moreover, it should be noted that the conditions in the model in which
foreclosure are proﬁtable are implausible in the ﬁnancial trading context.
In particular, they involve a peculiar asymmetry which (but for the tie)
favors an execution-only entrant over an established incumbent’s execution
services. In this model, as in Carlton-Waldman, tying is proﬁtable because
a successful execution-only entrant induces the market to tip to its services,
and subsequent to tipping has market power due to customer lock-in. That
is, customers are intially not locked into the incumbent’s execution services,
but become locked into the entrant’s; the incumbent ties in order to lock
customers into its execution services instead of the entrant’s. However,
inasmuch as incumbent exchanges have been in business for decades, and in
some cases, for more than a century, it is a stretch to argue that if lock-in is
a possibility that their customers are not locked in already. And if they are
locked in, the incumbent exchange has a competitive advantage even absent
a clearing tie; in this case, an execution-only incumbent faces little threat
of entry, and a clearing tie is often superﬂuous to protect the execution
monopoly. If customers are not locked into incumbent exchanges with long
histories, why would they become locked into an entrant, permitting that
ﬁrm to earn a market power rent?
In brief, network eﬀects in both execution and post-trade services pre-
clude deﬁnitive determination of the competitive and eﬃciency implications
of integration and tying. The network eﬀects in execution that tend to make
this function a natural monopoly distort entry incentives. As a result, fore-
closure is not per se ineﬃcient. Moreover, the conditions in which ineﬃcient
foreclosure can occur are not readily evident in the trading of ﬁnancial in-
35struments. If execution is potentially highly competitive because customers
are not locked into a particular execution venue, foreclosure is typically not
a proﬁt maximizing strategy for a clearing monopolist. Conversely, if lock
in is an important consideration that protects execution venues from entry,
clearing ties are superﬂuous to deter entry into execution.
4 Empirical Evidence
Vertical integration has long been, and remains, the rule in ﬁnancial mar-
kets. Table 1 details the organization of execution and clearing for a set
of equity and derivatives exchanges that account for virtually all trading in
these instruments around the world: an appendix available from the author
presents a comprehensive description of the ownership of clearing and set-
tlement arrangements around the world. This table shows that most equity
and derivatives exchanges own and operate their clearing and/or settlement
entities, as well as provide execution services. There are several instances
in which separate entities supply execution and post-execution services, but
in virtually all of these cases the execution venue either has an ownership
stake and governance role in the post-execution service provider, or there
is considerable overlap in the membership of the two entities. Of late, user
cooperatives are assuming a more important role in post-execution services,
especially where economies of scope are important. The ubiquity of in-
tegration, and the shift away from integration when scope economies are
important, is consistent with the hypothesis that eﬃciency considerations
drive the organization of ﬁnancial exchanges.
Thus, vertical integration of trade execution, settlement, and clearing in
a single ﬁrm–an exchange–is the modal form of organization in centralized
securities and derivatives markets. In most cases, the clearing and settlement
36operation is a division or wholly owned subsidiary of the exchange where
transactions are executed. In most of the remaining instances, the execution
venue has an ownership stake or governance role, or both, in the clearing
and settlement entities. The exception that proves the rule is the London
Stock Exchange, and even this entity operated its own settlement division
until mismanagement of technology induced regulators and users to set up
a separate venture.
Pervasive economies of scope in clearing and settlement are leading to
diminished exchange roles in some clearing and settlement entities, such as
DTCC and NSCC in the United States, and LCH.Clearnet in Europe. The
scope economies in clearing and settlement extend across multipleexchanges,
and also across centralized exchange and decentralized OTC markets. In
particular, the consolidation in banking and intermediation, whereby large
intermediaries (such as, Goldman Sachs or Citigroup or HSBC) participate
in myriad exchange and OTC markets, has increased these scope economies
in clearing and settlement. This provides a strong incentive to consolidate
clearing and settlement across exchanges and OTC markets. This has raised
the opportunity cost of vertical integration and exchange control over clear-
ing and settlement, relative to the alternative form of organization, clearing
and settlement cooperatives owned and operated by users of clearing and
settlement services. The decline in exchange ownership and control over
clearing and settlement entities that span exchange and OTC markets is
consistent with this change in relative costs.
In American futures markets, the move to electronic trading has en-
hanced economies of scope in trade execution. The two largest futures ex-
changes integrated their clearing functions (by contract) in 2003, and agreed
to merge in 2006. The merger was completed in 2007. The merged entity
37plans to clear through the CME-owned clearinghouse. In this instance,
economies of scope in clearing and trade execution allow economizing on
transactions costs in clearing through vertical integration, without sacriﬁc-
ing scope economies in execution.
Thus, consistent with the theory outlined in section 3.3, which states
that exchange ownership of execution, clearing, and settlement operations
economizes on transactions costs, such integration is the primary means of
organizing these functions except where scope economies in clearing and set-
tlement encompass markets where scope economies in execution are absent
(such as across exchange and OTC markets.)
5 Summary and Conclusions
The completion of a securities or derivatives transaction involves several
complementary activites, each characterized by considerable scale economies
arising from ﬁxed costs and network eﬀects. Indeed, each of the three
basic activities–execution, clearing, and settlement–exhibit strong natural
monopoly tendencies.
This poses challenges to the organization of ﬁnancial trading. Supply
of these functions by separate ﬁrms can give rise to multi-marginalization
problems and opportunistic holdups. Integration of these functions into a
single ﬁrm–an exchange–can economize on these costs.
Indeed, integration is the default mode of organization of securities and
derivatives trading. The vast majority of exchanges operate their own clear-
ing and settlement operations, or have a signiﬁcant ownership and control
stake in them. Recently, growing disparities in scope economies between
clearing and trade execution have put strains on this traditional mode of
organization, contributing to calls to de-integrate these activities. Where
38this de-integration has occurred, clearing and settlement are usually sup-
plied by user-owned and governed cooperatives, most of which operate (de
facto or de jure) as non-proﬁts that rebate fees to members proportional to
their volume.
Although integration has also given rise to assertions of foreclosure, the
pervasive scale economies in each activity make it unlikely that disintegra-
tion alone is suﬃcient to improve substantially the competitiveness of cen-
tralized trading of ﬁnancial instruments. Moreover, disintegration threatens
to result in ineﬃciencies due to multiple markups and opportunism. Thus,
transaction cost considerations, rather than market power concerns, should
be the primary focus of any analysis of ﬁnancial exchange organization. Any
attempt to improve competition in trading of securities and derivatives must
address simultaneously the impediments to competition in execution, clear-
ing, and settlement; disintegrationalone is an inadequate remedy for market
power in ﬁnancial trading.
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Panel A
The Organization of Clearing
Equity Exchanges
Exchange Integration Cooperative
NYSE O (pre-2007)
AMEX O (pre-2007)
NASDAQ O (pre-2007)
Euronext X (pre-2000) O (pre-2007)
Deutsche B¨ orse X
LSE N
Scandanavian Markets X
SWX X (post-2007) O (pre-2007)
TSE X
OSE X
HKSE X
SET X
ASE X
In this table, an “X” in the Integration column indicates that the exe-
cuting exchange owns its clearinghouse. An “O” in the Cooperative column
means that the executing exchange obtains clearing services from a coop-
erative ﬁrm in which it has an ownership stake. An “N” in this column
indicates that the executing exchange obtains clearing services from a co-
operative in which it does not have an ownership stake. NYSE, AMEX,
NASDAQ and Euronext announced plans to divest their ownership in their
clearers in 2006. SWX announced its merger with its clearer, SIS, in 2007.
40Table 1
Panel B
The Organization of Clearing
Derivatives Exchanges
Exchange Integration Cooperative
CBOT O (pre-2003)
CME X
ICE X N (pre-2007)
MGE X
NYMEX X
NYBOT X
US Options O
Canadian Derivatives O
AEX-Optibeurs X
BELFOX X
MATIF X
MONEP X
Eurex X
MIF-MTO IDEM X
OM X
SOFFEX X
LIFFE O
LME O
IPE O
TSE X
TIFFE X
SCE X
SGX X
HKFE X
TFE X
SFE X
A Cartellization Through a For-Proﬁt Clearing Co-
operative
Consider a clearing cooperative that charges a price PC per unit to its mem-
bers for clearing services, and then distributes net surplus to the broker-
41owners in ﬁxed shares. Broker i receives share αi < 1 of surplus, with
N
i=1 αi = 1. All other notation is identical to that in the formal model in
section 3.3.
In contrast to that model, here the brokerage ﬁrms are Cournot com-
petitors. Broker i chooses qi taking qj, j  = i as given, to maximize:
qiDB(
N 
j=1
qj) − Ci(qi) − PCqi + αi[
N 
j=1
qj(PC − cc) − F]
The term
N
j=1 qj(PC − cc) − F is the total proﬁt of the cooperative.
The ﬁrst order conditions are:
DB(
N 
j=1
qj)+qiD 
B(
N 
j=1
qj)=C 
i(qi)+( 1− αi)Pc + αicc
Note that output choice depends on PC and αi, because they inﬂu-
ence each ﬁrm’s perceived marginal cost (on the right-hand-side of the ex-
pression), whereas in the non-proﬁt cooperative PC does not aﬀect output
choices. Thus, the for-proﬁt cooperative can choose the clearing fee and the
ownership shares to aﬀect these choices.
Call {q∗
i}N
i=1 the set of outputs that maximizes the brokers’ aggregate
proﬁt–the “perfect cartel” output vector. The clearing cooperative can
choose PC and the αi to solve:
DB(
N 
j=1
q∗
j)+q∗
i D 
B(
N 
j=1
q∗
j) − C 
i(q∗
i)=( 1− αi)Pc + αicc
There are N + 1 equations (the N ﬁrst order conditions and the constraint
that the shares add to 1) and N + 1 unknowns (PC and the shares). For
a well-behaved demand function it is possible to solve these equations for
a clearing price and proﬁt division shares so that the Cournot competitors
choose the perfect cartel outputs. If the execution exchange has market
power, this results in extreme double marginalization.
42Thus, although the surplus of the cooperative is rebated to broker-
members in both the for-proﬁt and non-proﬁt cooperatives, the method
of the rebate matters. Paying surplus proportional to ﬁxed shares rather
than according to each individual ﬁrm’s output changes the nature of the
competitive interaction between the brokers.
It should be noted that if brokers are Cournot competitors but the co-
operative pays broker i a patronage dividend equal to qi(PC − cc), double
marginalizationoccurs, but the broker cooperative’s output exceeds the per-
fect cartel output for N>1. The Cournot competitors price their services
above marginal cost, and hence include a markup on cc, that the integrated
exchange does not. There is still a double markup because PB exceeds C 
i(qi)
in this case. Therefore, if the brokers are Cournot competitors, vertical in-
tegration can improve eﬃciency by mitigating (but not eliminating) double
marginalization.
Thus, supplier ownership of clearing can either mitigate or exacerbate
double marginalization problems, depending on the cooperative’s payout
policy and the competitiveness of the brokerage sector. A for-proﬁt cooper-
ative clearer can induce severe ineﬃciencies.
B Stochastic Dominance Proof
Consider ﬁrst the case where x1 − m1 > 0. In this case:
SI = x1 − m1 +m a x [ x2 − m2,m 1 − x1]
and
SS = x1 − m1 +m a x [ x2 − m2,0]
Since m1 − x1 < 0i nt h i sc a s e ,m a x [ x2 − m2,0] ≥ max[x2 − m2,m 1 − x1],
with a strict inequality for some values of x2. Thus, for any shortfall level
43¯ S ≥ 0, there are values of x2 such that ¯ S ≥ SI but SS > ¯ S, but no values of
x2 for which the reverse is true.
Now consider the case x1 − m1 < 0. In this case
SI =m a x [ x1 − m1 + x2 − m2,0] ≤ max[x2 − m2,0] = SS
with strict inequality for some values of x2. Again, this implies that there
are values of x2 such that for any shortfall level ¯ S, SI ≤ ¯ S but SS > ¯ S, but
no values for which the converse is true.
Thus, Pr[SI ≤ ¯ S] > Pr[SS ≤ ¯ S] ∀¯ S. QED.
C Tying and the Eﬃciency of Entry
Here I modify Carlton-Waldman to derive a model of the incentives of an
integrated incumbent exchange to engage in vertical foreclosure. I focus ini-
tiallyon an execution-only entrant, inasmuch as critics of vertical integration
commonly assert that clearing is a natural monopoly, and that competition
in execution would be enhanced by opening access to the incumbent’s clear-
ing facility; in contrast, Carlton-Waldman examine a market in which the
monopolized complementary good is not a natural monopoly, but would be
perfectly competitive but for some exogenous constraint. Moreover, the ex-
ogenous constraint on simultaneous entry into clearing and execution like
that assumed in Carlton-Waldman is inapplicable in ﬁnancial trading, so
after discussing execution-only entry I turn my attention to the integrated
entry case.
Some modiﬁcations to Carlton-Waldman are required to ﬁt salient fea-
tures of ﬁnancial markets. Carlton-Waldman analyze the case of a durable
good subject to network economies. In Carlton-Waldman’s two period
model, the good that consumers purchase in the ﬁrst period is usable in
44the second, and contributes to the total size of the network in the second
period. This durability “locks in” ﬁrst period purchasers into their initial
network choice in the second period, and thereby aﬀects second period com-
petitive interactions.
This is not relevant in a ﬁnancial trading context. Trading services are
not a durable good. Therefore, in the present model, which also has two
periods, the same consumers purchase in each period. I invoke a diﬀerent
source of lock in than do Carlton-Waldman.
There are two ﬁrms, an integrated incumbent that supplies both trad-
ing and clearing, and an execution-only entrant. The surplus a consumer
receives by purchasing execution services from the entrant is v(NE)+Δ ,
where NE is the total number of customers who use the entrant. More-
over, v (NE) > 0, due to network economies that derive from the nature of
liquidity. Similarly, surplus from purchasing from the incumbent is v(NI),
where NI is the total number of customers who use the incumbent, with
v (NI) > 0. The parameter Δ ≥ 0 is a measure of the superiority of the
entrant’s execution services. If Δ > 0, the entrant’s services are superior,
and given the size of the network, consumers are willing to pay more for
the entrant’s execution services than the incumbent’s. There is a total of N
customers.
The marginal cost of execution services is zero. The marginal cost of
clearing services is also zero.
The entrant incurs a cost of EC to enter the market. This cost incor-
porates the expense of building a trading system, and any costs that the
entrant incurs to coordinate the defection of customers from the incumbent.
If the entrant incurs this cost, consumers can choose freely where to trade
in the ﬁrst period. If the entrant does not incur this cost, the customers are
45locked into the incumbent exchange.
If the entrant succeeds in inducing the market to “tip” to it during the
ﬁrst period, the incumbent can attempt to regain control of order ﬂow in
the second period by incurring a cost of IC. If the incumbent incurs this
cost, customers can choose to trade on the incumbent’s execution system
even if they defected to the entrant in the ﬁrst period. If customers defected
in the ﬁrst period, and the incumbent does not pay this cost, customers are
locked into the entrant in the second period. Thus, EC can be viewed as
the cost of overcoming initial customer lock-in, and IC can be interpreted
as the incumbent’s cost of overcoming lock-in if the market initially tips to
the entrant.
The timing of the model is as follows. First, the incumbent exchange
decides whether or not to tie clearing and execution. If the incumbent ties,
the entrant cannot oﬀer execution services because clearing and execution
must be consumed in ﬁxed proportions. Second, the entrant decides whether
to enter. Third, if the incumbent has not tied, the entrant and incumbent
choose their prices for execution services, and the incumbent chooses a price
for clearing services. Fourth, customers choose which exchange to trade on in
the ﬁrst period. Fifth, if customers have chosen to patronize the incumbent
in the ﬁrst period, the incumbent chooses whether to incur the IC in the
second period. The incumbent and the entrant can also bargain at this time
over surplus to be divided between them. Sixth, if the execution market
has tipped to the entrant, the incumbent does not pay IC, and the entrant
and the incumbent have not reached a bargain over surplus, the entrant and
the incumbent split the surplus between them evenly (as would occur under
Nash bargaining.)
Consider ﬁrst the division of surplus if the market has tipped to the
46entrant. (I will show momentarily that the market tips to one supplier
or the other, so tipping outcomes are the only equilibrium-relevant ones.)
Here total surplus is NΔ+Nv(N), and the entrant and the incumbent (who
continues to supply clearing services) split this amount; there is a bilateral
monopoly here, and the monopolists of the two segments split the total
available rent.
If consumers choose to patronize the incumbent’s execution services in
the ﬁrst period, the incumbent captures the total surplus of Nv(N)i nt h e
second period.
Now consider the bargaining between the entrant and the incumbent
assuming the execution market has tipped to the entrant in the ﬁrst pe-
riod. Following Carlton-Waldman, I assume that the entrant and incumbent
evenly split the surplus attributable to (a) the entrant’s superior product
and (b) the entrant’s now lower costs (lower because the incumbent must
incur a cost to re-enter execution). By incurring cost IC and coordinating
the defection of the customers from the entrant, surplus is Nv(N) − IC.
When customers obtain execution services from the entrant, total surplus
is NΔ+Nv(N). The diﬀerence in surplus is IC + NΔ. As a result of the
bargaining, the entrant receives .5NΔ+.5IC, and the incumbent receives
the balance of the surplus .5NΔ+Nv(N)− .5IC.
The basic idea here is that the incumbent’s ability to compete for execu-
tion order ﬂow in the second period constrains the entrant’s pricing power
even if the execution market has tipped to the entrant in the ﬁrst period.
The costlier it is for the incumbent to re-enter the execution market (due to
the stickiness of order ﬂow, parameterized by IC), the greater the entrant’s
bargaining power and the greater its second period rent if the market tips
its way in the ﬁrst period.
47Given the bilateral monopoly in the second period that results if the
market tips, consumers receive no surplus in the second period. Without loss
of generality, if the market does not tip, consumers who choose the entrant
in the ﬁrst period receive surplus of sE(NE) if a total of NE consumers
choose the entrant. Similarly, those who choose the incumbent in the ﬁrst
period receive a surplus of sI(NI)i fNI choose the incumbent in the ﬁrst
period. Consumers are atomistic (as in Carlton-Waldman), so when making
his decision each consumer takes NE and NI as given.
Now consider consumers’ choices on where to trade in the ﬁrst period.
When the entrant chooses an execution price of PE, the incumbent chooses
an execution price of PI, and the incumbent’s clearing price is PC, an (atom-
istic) consumer chooses to patronize the entrant if:
Δ+v(NE) − PC − PE + sE(NE) >v (NI) − PC − PI + sI(NI).
If the reverse is true, the atomistic consumer chooses to patronize the in-
cumbent. Note that if this expression holds for one customer, it holds for
all, so the market tips to the entrant in this case; in the reverse situation,
the market tips to the incumbent.
As in Carlton-Waldman, and as is customary in the network industry
literature, I assume that consumer choices are coordinated to maximize their
surplus. Therefore, if
Δ+v(N) − PC − PE >v (N) − PC − PI
the market tips to the entrant. Otherwise, it tips to the incumbent.
Now consider the pricing of services when the incumbent does not tie.
In order to preclude “virtual” ties, I constrain PI ≥ 0.25 Without loss of
25As in Carlton-Waldman, due to network economies the clearing monopolist can some-
48generality, I set PI = 0. Therefore, to get any execution business, under
the coordination assumption, PE ≤ Δ as otherwise the entrant would get
no business. Moreover, the pricing equilibrium is not unique. If the entrant
chooses a price of PE, the incumbent’s best response is to choose PC =
Δ+v(N) − PE. For the purpose of determining entry decisions, I assume
that the incumbent and the entrant believe that any outcome PE ∈ [0,Δ]
is equally likely. That is, the entrant expects to sell at a price of .5Δ in the
ﬁrst period.
Therefore, in equilibrium, in the absence of tying, if entry occurs, the
market tips to the entrant in the ﬁrst period, the entrant monopolizes exe-
cution, and the incumbent monopolizes clearing.
The entrant’s proﬁt is ΠE = .5NΔ+.5NΔ+.5IC. The entrant captures
half of the surplus associated with its superior product in each period. It
also captures surplus equal to half of the incumbent’s re-entry cost. The
incumbent’s proﬁt is ΠI = NΔ+2 Nv(N)− .5IC. By tying, the incumbent
earns 2Nv(N).
Note that the incumbent faces conﬂicting incentives with regard to tying.
On the one hand, the ability to capture some of the surplus associated
with the entrant’s superior product provides an incentive to permit entry.
This is the basic “Chicago School” argument that eﬃcient supply of the
complementary good raises the monopolist’s derived demand. On the other
hand, the fact that the entrant obtains some market power if the market tips
to it, and hence can extract some market power rents in the second period
that the incumbent would otherwise capture, provides an incentive for the
times proﬁtably deter entry into execution by selling execution services below cost, and
recouping the lost revenue by raising the price of clearing services. CW refer to this as a
virtual tie.
49incumbent to deter entry through tying. This is the basic Carlton-Waldman
motive for tying.
If 2NΔ ≥ EC, entry is eﬃcient. Three cases are relevant here:
• IC > 2NΔ >E C. Here, tying makes the incumbent better oﬀ, so it
ties. This deters entry that would occur but for the tie, so an ineﬃcient
outcome results.
• 2NΔ >I C >E C. Tying makes the incumbent worse oﬀ. It will not
tie, and the eﬃcient outcome results.
• 2NΔ >E C >I C. Tying again makes the incumbent worse oﬀ. How-
ever, entry is sometimes unproﬁtable in this case. Therefore, the in-
cumbent does not tie, but entry may not occur nonetheless.26
If 2NΔ <E C entry is ineﬃcient. Again, three cases are relevant:
• IC >E C > 2NΔ. The incumbent ties, but this is eﬃcient. Market
power makes entry ineﬃciently proﬁtable. The entrant can capture a
rent due to the lack of competition in execution in the second period
due to tipping and the cost of overcoming the stickiness of order ﬂow.
Therefore, in this case tying prevents dissipatory entry.
• EC >I C > 2NΔ. Entry is unproﬁtable even absent a tie.
• EC > 2NΔ >I C. Entry is unproﬁtable even absent a tie.
Therefore, this simple model suggests that tying may not occur for strate-
gic purposes, and if it does, its eﬃciency eﬀects are ambiguous. Tying may
26There is an incentive for the entrant with the superior technology and the clearing
monopolist to merge in this instance.
50be proﬁtable and preclude eﬃcient entry, but tying may be proﬁtable and
deter ineﬃcient, dissipative entry. Due to the imperfection in competition
in execution in the second period attributable to customer lock-in, the en-
trant secures a market power rent. This reduces the proﬁtability of clearing,
and if this reduction is large enough provides the incumbent an incentive to
tie. However, this market power rent may also overcompensate the entrant.
That is, entry may occur for rent seeking reasons even when it is ineﬃcient.
Note that tying for strategic reasons is often superﬂuous. If entry costs
are suﬃciently high, that is, if EC is suﬃciently high relative to NΔa n d
IC, the entrant cannot recoup its costs even if the incumbent does not tie.
Further note that ineﬃcient tying and dissipativeentry both require IC >
EC. That is, the incumbent’s cost to overcome the order ﬂow advantage
of a successful entrant in the second period is greater than the entrant’s
cost of overcoming the incumbent’s order ﬂow advantage in the ﬁrst period.
This condition seems implausible. It would seem much more diﬃcult for an
entrant to overcome the order ﬂow advantage of an established incumbent
exchange, than for an established incumbent to re-capture business from a
successful entrant. At the very least, it would seem that the situation is
symmetrical.
Thus, a theoretical model that incorporates salient features of the trad-
ing of ﬁnancial instruments, notably the importance of network eﬀects and
customer lock-in, provides little support for a blanket condemnation of ty-
ing. Network economies and lock-in make competition imperfect. In such
a second-best world, entry is not always eﬃcient, and hence tying that pre-
vents entry is sometimes eﬃcient. Moreover, the most plausible outcome
is that tying is strategically superﬂuous; if an entrant incurs a greater cost
to wrest order ﬂow from an incumbent than the incumbent would incur to
51wrest it back, tying cannot be ineﬃcient, and the incumbent may be immune
from entry into execution even if it does not tie.
It should be noted that these basic results are similar to those in Carlton-
Waldman. Due to the market power rent that an entrant can earn, entry
can be ineﬃcient in their model as well.
Finally, this model ignores transaction cost and double marginalization
ineﬃciencies that result from non-integration of clearing and execution. To
the extent that an entry bears only a fraction of these costs, entry incentives
are further distorted, and the eﬃciency beneﬁts of tying are enhanced.
The foregoing analysis assumes that integrated entry is not feasible. In
fact, some exchanges (e.g., Eurex US) have oﬀered bundled execution and
clearing services during their attempts to enter a market. It is straightfor-
ward to show that (a) tying cannot aﬀect an integrated entrant, and (b) due
to the presence of market power rents, such entry may be dissipative. Such
entry is best modeled as a “War of Attrition” (Tirole, 1988).
D Empirical Evidence on Exchange Organization
D.1 US Equity Markets
The ﬁrst stock clearing and settlement system was initiated by the Philadel-
phia Stock Exchange in 1870 (Shultz, 1946). In 1892 the New York Stock
Exchange implemented a system for clearing and settlement of stock trades.
Initially, the exchange clearinghouse only cleared and settled stock balances;
money balances were not netted or cleared (Schabacker, 1930). Netting and
clearing of money balances commenced in 1920. Prior to 1918 the clearing-
house was a department of the NYSE. In 1918, the exchange organized a
new clearing corporation, that was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the NYSE
Shultz (1946).
52Other US equity exchanges, including the American Stock Exchange and
the various regional exchanges, operated their own clearing branches. In the
1960s, the Wall Street paperwork crisis led the exchanges to explore initia-
tives to facilitate clearing and settlement. The ﬁrst was the creation in 1973
of the Depository Trust Company that immobilized stock certiﬁcates and
introduced book entry delivery and settlement. The second was the estab-
lishment in 1976 of the National Securities Clearing Corporation, through
the merger of the stock clearing aﬃliates of the NYSE, the American Stock
Exchange, and the National Association of Securities Dealers. The NSCC
was, and is, a CCP. Since its introduction, the regional exchanges have elim-
inated their stock clearing operations and joined the NSCC.27 The NSCC
was originally owned by the exchanges.28 In subsequent years, “participant
ﬁrms,” mainly clearing brokers, have acquired ownership stakes. By 2006,
the NYSE, NASD, and AMEX owned 36.4 percent of the DTCC. In 2006,
exchanges’ common shares were redistributed to participant members. The
exchanges continue to hold preferred shares in DTCC, and have the right to
name a director to the board.29
This change reﬂects the dramatic evolution in the DTCC in the years
since its founding. Originally established to clear and settle stock transac-
tions, in the past 30 years it has added services to clear government securi-
ties, mortgage backed securities, and some derivatives trades, none of which
are traded on organized exchanges. This expansion allowed the DTCC to
27www.dtcc.com/AboutUs/history.htm.
28Id.
29Steve Letzler, DTCC Completes Change in Share Ownership,
www.dtcc.com/Publications/dtcc/apro06/share.htm.
53exploit scope economies across these various instruments, as participants in
these markets largely overlap. This has reduced the beneﬁts of exchange
ownership and control, and exchange ownership has indeed declined accord-
ingly.
The DTCC provides clearing services at cost. Speciﬁcally, it prices its
services to generate only the revenues necessary to “liquidate current pro-
duction costs, provide for a continuance of product enhancement and devel-
opment, provide for a discount when volume levels are equal to or greater
than projections and provide for retained earnings as directed by the Board”
(Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation, 2006). The NSCC rebates fees
to clearing ﬁrms when revenues are in excess of projected costs.It is therefore
quite similar to the cooperative modeled in section 3.3, and the exchanges
have a role in its organization and governance.
D.2 US Futures Markets
• Chicago Board of Trade. Between 1883 and 1925, The Chicago Board
of Trade operated a department to net margin payments. This entity
did not serve as a central counterparty, and hence had no liabilityin the
event of a default. Instead, it merely calculated members’ net margin
obligations, and facilitated the transfer of margin payments between
members. In 1925, the exchange formed a separate corporation, the
Board of Trade Clearing Corporation. This ﬁrm did serve as a CCP.
BOTCC was (and remains) a Delaware for-proﬁt corporation.30 Orig-
inally, exchange rules required each of the CBT’s members to purchase
shares in the clearinghouse, and allowed only CBT members to utilize
30http://www.clearingcorp.com/bylaws/certinc.html. It is now called the Clearing Cor-
poration, following the severing of its relation with the CBT.
54BOTCC’s clearing services (Kroszner, 2006). That is, each CBT mem-
ber cleared his own trades through BOTCC and only through BOTCC.
Over time, however, it became evident that there were advantages for
brokerage ﬁrms to clear for multiple members as well as for public
customers, so the requirement that each CBT member own a stake in
BOTCC was eliminated. Those CBT members who did not remain as
BOTCC owners used BOTCC members to guarantee their contracts.
However, CBT members had the right to join BOTCC (subject to the
clearer’s minimum capital requirements.) BOTCC established sepa-
rate capital requirements for sole proprieterships, partnerships, and
corporations, thereby facilitating membership for all types of CBT
member ﬁrms. Until 2003, CBT rules required exchange members to
clear through BOTCC exclusively.
As a for-proﬁt corporation, BOTCC was able to pay dividends. How-
ever, it has never done so.31 Instead, any surpluses were retained as
capital to be used to cover the costs of any defaults. Based on trading
volumes and open interest, BOTCC’s board of directors determined
how much capital was required to meet the company’s anticipated de-
fault obligations. To the extent that clearing revenues net of expenses
exceeded the desired increase in capital, BOTCC cut the clearing fees
it charged its member-users. Since the cost of the capital required
to meet defaults is a major expense of a CCP, BOTCC eﬀectively,
though not formally, acted as a cooperative that charged prices which
31The following description of BOTCC and its operations was obtained from an in-
terview with Kevin R. McClear, Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary of the
Clearing Corporation.
55just covered costs similar to that modelled formally supra.32 More-
over, BOTCC adjusted the ownership shares of member-brokers with
volume; the shares of ﬁrms losing (gaining) volume relative to total
volume were reduced (increased).
Although the CBT and BOTCC were separate companies, whose own-
ership did not overlap completely after the BOTCC’s early days, sev-
eral factors served to align the incentives of the trade execution venue
(the CBT) and the clearer (BOTCC), thereby preventing opportunism
and double marginalization. Speciﬁcally, (a) CBT members–including
individual “local” traders who dominated CBT governance–had the
ability to become BOTCC members, (b) until 2000, voting on BOTCC
was one member-one vote, rather than one share-one vote, and (c) all
members of BOTCC were required to own CBT seats. Thus, although
BOTCC rules speciﬁed a relation between a ﬁrm’s share ownership
and the volume of trades it cleared, with large ﬁrms having larger
share ownership than small ﬁrms, each member had the same voting
share regardless of ownership share.
These provisions limited the ability of large brokerage ﬁrms to take
actions (e.g., restricting entry, or engaging in opportunism) that bene-
ﬁtted BOTCC’s large corporate broker-owners and adversely aﬀected
other CBT members. The individual proprieterships and partner-
ships that dominated control of the CBT could become (and became)
32BOTCC was somewhat similar to mutual insurance companies, as analyzed by Hans-
mann (1996). Hansmann notes the possibility that insurance mutuals have a tendency to
accumulate excessive capital due to the inability of members to control managers. That
problem was presumably less severe at BOTCC since it had a relatively small number of
members (147 for an extended period), each of which actively interacted with BOTCC on
an ongoing basis, and who had a strong incentive to avoid excessive capitalization.
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ership due to the one member-one vote rule. The adjustment of owner-
ship shares to reﬂect volume shares also tied a ﬁrm’s share of BOTCC
surplus to its own volume, rather than giving each member a ﬁxed
share. This mechanism made BOTCC more like the eﬃcient non-proﬁt
cooperative described in the main text than the potentially cartelizing
clearing entity modeled in the appendix.
At the initiative of the large corporate brokerages, BOTCC voting
rules were changed from one member-one vote to one share-one vote
in 2000. Relations between BOTCC and the CBT became strained
soon thereafter. In 2003, BOTCC entered into an agreement to clear
trades for the Swiss-German exchange Eurex, which was entering the
US market in direct competition with the CBT. In response, the CBT
rescinded its rule requiring its members to clear through BOTCC,
and required them instead to clear through the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange clearing division under terms of a contract between the two
exchanges. In 2006 the CME and CBT agreed to merge.
The CBT-BOTCC relationship represents an interesting governance
structure. The companies were formally separate, and for many years
did not have a direct contractual relationship. However, the ability of
CBT members to become BOTCC owners, and the disproportionate
voting power of the individual CBT members who dominated the gov-
ernance of the exchange, damped the conﬂicts between these entities.
However, the consolidation of the brokerage industry exacerbated the
disparity between the ownership shares and voting shares of BOTCC
members. The large brokerage ﬁrms forced a change in the voting rules
that reduced the power of non-broker CBT members. The relation-
57ship between the two ﬁrms ended acrimoniously soon thereafter, and
the CBT entered into a formal contract with the CME, and eventually
agreed to merge with that exchange.
• Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange es-
tablished a clearing division in 1919 (Tamarkin, 1993). The exchange
continues to maintain and operate a Clearing House.The exchange is
required to utilize surplus funds to satisfy Clearing House obligations
in the event that the Clearing House’s own resources are inadequate.
• Minneapolis Grain Exchange. The clearinghouse is a department of
the Minneapolis Grain Exchange (Rules and Regulations of the Min-
neapolis Grain Exchange).
• Kansas City Board of Trade. The Kansas City Board of Trade owns
all of the outstanding shares of the Kansas City Board of Trade Clear-
ing Corporation (Kansas City Board of Trade Clearing Corporation
Charter and By-Laws) Membership in the clearinghouse is open to
any KCBT member in good standing.
• New York Mercantile Exchange. NYMEX operates a clearing depart-
ment (New York Mercantile Exchange Bylaws) The Clearing House
operates under direction of the exchange Clearing House Committee,
and the NYMEX president is manager of the clearinghouse (New York
MercantileExchange Rules) Membership in the Clearing House is open
to any member of the exchange.
• New York Board of Trade. The Commodity Clearing Corporation
is the CCP for the NYBOT; it is a wholly owned subsidiary of the
exchange. Membership in the Clearing Corporation is open to any
58member of the NYBOT.
D.3 US Options Markets
The ﬁrst US optionsexchange, the ChicagoBoard Options Exchange, formed
its own clearinghouse when the exchange was launched in 1973. In 1975, two
additional exchanges began trading options. At this time, these exchanges
collaborated to form the Options Clearing Corporation. The exchanges
owned OCC in equal shares. In subsequent years, additional exchanges
have commenced options trading, and each has become an owner of the
OCC. Thus, the OCC is a completely exchange-owned entity. Moreover,
OCC prices its services at a level suﬃcient to meet expenses. If the OCC
Board deems that revenues exceed its funding needs, it rebates fees to clear-
ing members.
D.4 Canadian Derivatives Markets
The Canadian exchanges that trade derivatives, the Montreal Exchange, the
Toronto Stock Exchange, the Vancouver Stock Exchange, and the Toronto
Futures Exchange, jointly own the Canadian Derivatives Clearing Corpora-
tion, which clears futures and options trades for these exchanges (Bank for
International Settlements, 1996).
D.5 European Equity Markets
• Euronext. Euronext was formed by the merger of the Dutch, French,
and Belgian stock exchanges. Prior to the merger, each of these ex-
changes operated a clearing subsidiary (European Competition Com-
mission DG (“ECCDG” hereafter), 2004). After the merger in 2000,
the exchanges established Clearnet SA as their CCP. Euronext owned
Clearnet. In 2003, Clearnet and LCH (the London Clearinghouse)
59agreed to merge. LCH cleared for London futures exchanges, and was
owned by the London Metal Exchange, the London International Fi-
nancial Futures and Options Exchange, the International Petroleum
Exchange, and clearing brokers, with the exchanges having a minority
stake (LCH.Clearnet Annual Report, 2005) After the Clearnet-LCH
merger, the merged ﬁrm LCH.Clearnet was owned by users and ex-
changes, with Euronext holding a 41.5 percent stake (with voting lim-
ited to 24.9 percent), LME 2.7 percent, IPE .9 percent, market users
45.1 percent, and Euroclear (a clearing bank) holding the remaining
9.8 percent (ECCDG).
LCH operated along the lines of the cooperative model analyzed for-
mally in section 3.3 (ECCDG). However, LCH.Clearnet operates as a
for-proﬁt entity (ECCDG). The analysis of section 3.3 suggests that
this could pose multi-marginalization problems, although the owner-
ship stake and voting inﬂuence of the exchanges would tend to dampen
the incentive to engage in this conduct.
• Deutsche B¨ orse. Deutsche B¨ orse owns 50 percent of Eurex Clear-
ing, AG, which clears all DB stock trades. In 2002, DB purchased
Clearstream, which settles all DB equity transactions (ECCDG).
• London Stock Exchange. The LSE operated a Settlement Department
beginning some time prior to World War II, and re-established this
department in 1947 after a war-induced hiatus (Michie, 1999). The
exchange continued to operate its own settlement department until
1993, when its failure to implement the automated Taurus settlement
project caused the Bank of England to intervene and foster the estab-
lishment of a separate settlement entity, CRESTCo(Michie, 1999; Eu-
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Matter, 2005). CRESTCo was owned and governed by market users,
and returned excess earnings to users (Euroclear, 2005).
LSE adopted a CCP for its SETS trading system in 2001. SETS trades
were cleared through LCH, and settled at CRESTCo. LSE trades are
now cleared by LCH.Clearnet.
LSE is unique in that it has no ownership stake or governance role
in the ﬁrms that clear or settle its trades. LSE is also in the process
of encouraging competition in clearing. Beginning in 2007, exchange
users will be able to clear through LCH.Clearnet or SIS x-clear (Lon-
don Stock Exchange, 2006). Although the pervasive scale and scope
economies make the survival of two competing clearinghouses prob-
lematic, LSE’s desire to encourage competition in clearing is under-
standable as a way of reducing its vulnerability to holdup and multiple
marginalization.
• Scandanavian Markets. HEX Integrated Markets Oy operates ex-
changes in Sweden, Finland, Latvia, and Estonia. All of these ex-
changes clear and settle through APK, a HEX subsidiary (ECCDG).
• SWX. Heretofore the Swiss Stock Exchange SWX has not had a central
counterparty service. Instead, the exchange guaranteedmember trades
(Swiss Stock Exchange, 2006a). The exchange is in the process of
launching a CCP service. Like LSE, the SWX will oﬀer users the
choice of either LCH.Clearnet or SIS. In this new arrangement, all
SWX participant ﬁrms must become a member of either LCH.Clearnet
or SISClear (Swiss Stock Exchange, 2006b).
SIS operates as a non-proﬁt that rebates fees to members (SIS Group
61Annual Report, 2005). It is owned by Swiss banks, with UBS AG
and Credit Suisse Group holding a majority stake.33 SWX is owned
by 55 banks, each of which have an equal vote in the exchange.34
The requirement that SWX members join SIS (or LCH.Clearnet), the
considerable overlap of ownership between SWX and SIS, and the
non-proﬁt organization of SIS make the impending Swiss arrangement
quite similar to that of the Chicago Board of Trade and BOTCC at
the time of the latter’s creation. Common ownership of SWX and
SIS mitigates conﬂicts between the entities, and the non-proﬁt form
of SIS addresses double markup problems. SIS also provides clearing
services in instruments other than Swiss stocks, and hence exploits
scope economies.
In May, 2007, SWX and SIS announced their intention to merge. Thus,
when the merger is consummated (in late-2007, if the merger proceeds
according to plan), the combined entity will be vertically integrated
into clearing and execution, although SWX users will still have the op-
tionto utilizeLCH.Clearnet clearingifthey choose. The stated reasons
for the merger are illuminating, and consistent with the transactions
cost theory presented above. The entities statethat the integrated ﬁrm
can respond more eﬃciently to rapid technological change, changing
customer needs, and regulatory shocks.35 Recall from section 3.3 that
theory suggests that integration facilitates coordination of responses
33http://www.group.sisclear.com/sis/index/sisgroup/sisgroup-shareregister.htm.
34Bourse Turns its Back on Merger Mania, swissinfo, November 24, 2006.
35Merger of SWX, SIS and Telekurs, Media Conference of 15 May 2007.
http://www.swxgroup.com/dowload/media releases/2007/media20070515b presentation en.pdf.
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D.6 European Derivative Markets
• AEX-Optibeurs. The European Options Clearing Corporation, a wholly
owned subsidiary of Amsterdam Exchanges, NV, the operator of AEX-
Optibeurs, provides clearing services for this exchange (BIS).
• Belgian Futures and Options Exchange. The Clearing is performed by
a department of the exchange (BIS).
• March´ e` a Terme Internationale de France. While MATIF was in-
dependent, in 1990 it acquired the clearinghouse Banque Centrale de
CompensationSA. This subsidiary cleared all MATIF trades (LCH.Clearnet
Annual Report, 2006.
• March´ e des Options Negociables de Paris. This exchange was owned
by Societ´ edesBoursesF ran¸ ais. The SBF’s clearing department cleared
MONEP deals (BIS).
• Detusche Terminb¨ orse and Eurex. Eurex Clearing, a subsidiary of
Eurex, clears contracts on this market (ECCDG).
• MIF-MTO and IDEM. Contracts on these Italian exchanges are cleared
by Cassa di Compensazione e garunzia, a separate corporation. Cassa
is owned by 21 clearing members, all of whom are exchange members.
Moreover, all exchange members that trade derivatives must be Cassa
members (BIS)¿
• OM. The exchange and clearing facility are both owned by OM Grup-
pen AB (BIS).
• SOFFEX. The Clearinghouse is a department of the exchange (BIS).
63• LIFFE, LME, IPE. LCH (and latterly, LCH.Clearnet) clears for these
exchanges.36 Prior to the LCH-Clearnet merger, the three exchanges
owned collectively 25 percent of LCH (BIS). The exchanges have a
smaller ownership stake in the merged clearing entity.
• ICE. The Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”) purchased the IPE in
2005, and initially continued obtaining clearing through LCH. In 2007,
however, ICE announced its intention to create its own clearinghouse
in London.
D.7 Asian and Australian Equity Markets
• Tokyo Stock Exchange. The TSE clears derivatives transactions through
the Japan Securities Clearing Corporation. Before 1997, it did not
serve as a CCP (BIS). JSCC is now a full-ﬂedged CCP. The TSE owns
86.3 percent of JSCC, and ﬁve other Japanese equity and derivatives
exchanges own the balance.37
• Osaka Securities Exchange. The OSE clears through JSCC, of which
it owns 9.5 percent.38
• Singapore Exchange. The clearinghouse is a department of the ex-
change.39
36IPE is now a subsidiary of the IntercontinentalExchange, and goes by the name of
ICEFutures.
37http://www.jscc.co.jp/english/about/index.html.
38http://www.ose.or.jp/e/stocks/index.html.
39http://info.sgx.com/SGXWeb CORPCOM.nsf/NEWDOCNAME/Background On SGX.
64• Hong Kong Exchanges. Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing, LTD,
operates both trade execution and clearing functions.40
• Stock Exchange of Thailand. The Thailand Securities Depository Com-
pany, Ltd., provides clearing and settlement services to SET. It is a
wholly owned subsidiary of the exchange.41
• Australian Securities Exchange. Formed by the merger of seven re-
gional stock markets in 1997, the ASX originally operated a default
guarantee fund (rather than a CCP) through the Securities and Ex-
changes Guarantee Corporation, which managed the National Guar-
antee Fund. The SECG was a wholly owned subsidiary of the of the
ASX.42 In 2002, ASX restructured its clearing and settlement opera-
tions and created a CCP called the Australian Clearing House.43 It
also formed an entity called the Australian Settlement and Transfer
Corporation Pty Ltd to settle its transactions. The ACH and ASTC
are subsidiaries of ASX.44
D.8 Asian and Australian Derivative Markets
• Tokyo Stock Exchange. The TSE clears derivatives transactions through
the Japan Securities Clearing Corporation. As noted above, the TSE
40http://www.hkex.com.hk/infra/dcass/dcass%20e.pdf.
41http://www.set.or.th/en/operation/clearing/clearing p1.html.
42http://www.segc.com.au/pdf/ngf information booklet.pdf.
43http://www.asx.com.au/about/pdf/ach 221102.pdf.
44http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdﬂib.nsf/LookupByFileName/ASX assessment report feb 2006.pdf/$ﬁle/ASX
assessment report feb 2006.pdf.
65owns 86.3 percent of JSCC.
• Tokyo International Financial Futures Exchange. A department of
TIFFE clears its trades (BIS).
• Singapore Commodity Exchange. The clearinghouse is a department
of the exchange.45
• Singapore Exchange. The clearinghouse is a department of the ex-
change.46
• Hong Kong Exchanges. Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing, LTD,
operates both trade execution and clearing functions.47
• Thailand Futures Exchange. The TFEX is a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Stock Exchange of Thailand, and clears through another wholly-
owned subsidiary.
• Sydney Futures Exchange. Sydney Futures Exchange Clearing Corpo-
ration Pty Ltd, a subsidiary of the Sydney Futures Exchange, provides
clearing services for the SFE.48
45http://www.sicom.com.sg/index sub.asp?content=aboutus
46http://info.sgx.com/SGXWeb CORPCOM.nsf/NEWDOCNAME/Background On SGX.
47http://www.hkex.com.hk/infra/dcass/dcass%20e.pdf.
48http://www.sfe.com.au/index.html?content/clearing/intro.htm.
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